Evolution of Auditor Liability to Noncontractual Third Parties: Balancing the Equities and Weighing the Consequences by Scherl, Jodi B.
EVOLUTION OF AUDITOR LIABILITY TO
NONCONTRACTUAL THIRD PARTIES:




Introduction . .................................... 256
I. Accounting Functions and Principles .............. 259
A. The Auditing Function ..................... 259
B. Types of Audit Reports ...................... 259
C. The Accounting Standard of Care:
GAAP and GAAS ........................... 260
1. GAAS and GAAP defined ................. 260
2. Standards and principles guiding audits ...... 262
D. Economic and Commercial Realities for the
Accountant ............................... 262
II. Historical Perspective: Common Law
Liability-Ultramares and the Privity Bar ............ 263
A. Historical Background of Privity ............... 265
B. The Ultramars Doctrine ...................... 265
C. The New York Court of Appeals Follows
Ultramares ............................... 269
III. The Foreseeability Approach ..................... 271
IV. The Restatement Approach ...................... 273
V. Analysis ..................................... 277
A. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co.: Knowledge
Required to Hold Accountants Liable ........... 277
1. Liability disproportionate to fault ........... 281
* Note & Comment Editor, The American University Law Review, Washington College of
Law;J.D. Candidate, 1995.
256 THE AMERICAN UNIVERsITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:255
2. Theories of contract liability found
more appropriate ....................... 282
3. Loss spreading and accurate accounting ...... 283
B. Security Pacific Business Credit v.
Peat Marwick Main & Co ...................... 284
VI. Recommendations ............................. 286
A. Foreseeability Is Too Expansive to Provide
Incentive for Accountants to Improve
Services . ................................. 286
B. The Strict Privity Approach Is Too Narrow ....... 287
C. The Intermediate Approach Achieves the
Best Results ............................... 288
Conclusion ....................................... 288
INTRODUCTION
Audits have been referred to as "admission tickets" for investors and
creditors.' An enterprise seeking financing through loans, stock
offerings, and other forms of credit enhancement looks to investors
and creditors. 2  Creditors and investors, in turn, look to the
enterprise's financial audit in making lending and investing deci-
sions.3 Given this common scenario, an audit legitimizes the track
record of a business by providing opinions4 on financial statements.5
If the auditor' issues a clean audit,7 indicating a healthy enterprise,
investors and creditors are often willing to provide credit and/or
1. Scott Vick, Note, Bily v. Arthur Young & Co.: Is LimitingAuditor Liability to Third Parties
Favoritism or Fair Play?, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1335, 1336 (1993); see also Bily v. Arthur Young &
Co., 834 P.2d 745, 751 (Cal.) (noting businesses' frequent use of audits to establish financial
credibility), modified, 3 Cal. 4th 1049a (1992).
2. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNER-
SHIPS AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS 297 (4th ed. 1990) (explaining corporate sources of capital).
3. SeeVick, supra note 1, at 1336 (discussing importance of audits for entrance into venture
capital markets); see also infra Part I.A (discussing purposes of audits).
4. In this context, the term "opinions" is meant to convey the auditor's conclusions on the
financial condition of the business as reflected in the financial statement.
5. SeeJohn A. Siliciano, Negligent Accounting and the Limits of Instrumental Tort Reform, 86
MICH. L. REv. 1929, 1932 (1988) (explaining how audits convince third parties to extend credit
to, and invest in, particular business).
6. Throughout this Comment, the terms "accountant" and "auditor" are used interchange-
ably.
7. See Vick, supra note 1, at 1336 n.5, 1343-44 (defining clean audit as "an auditor's
statement that the client's financial statements, taken as a whole, represent the entity's actual
financial position"); see also Willis W. Hagen, II, CertifiedPublicAccountants'LiabilityforMalpractie:
Effect of Compliance with GAAP and GAAS, 13J. CoN'EMP. L. 65, 66 (1987) (defining audit as
independent inquiry made by accountant into how fairly entity's financial statements reflect its
actual financial position).
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needed capital.8 In essence, investors and creditors are attracted to
the enterprise based on its financial stability, which is certified by the
audit.
A problem with extending loans and credit arises, however, when
investors and creditors rely on an unqualified audit opinion9
prepared by an accountant, and are thereafter faced with an insolvent
debtor who has defaulted on its payment obligations.' ° Because a
business fails, the question becomes whether the audit opinion was,
in fact, not accurate, and if not accurate, whether the audit was
negligently prepared by the accountant." Investors and lenders tend
to treat business failures as audit failures, and often look to the
auditor when searching for a solvent party from whom losses may be
recovered. 2 These business failures result in actions against the
accountant for negligently preparing an audit that erroneously
depicted a healthy business, which in fact was failing.
This Comment will focus on the degree to which an accountant's
duty of care 3 in preparing an audit extends beyond the entity in
privity with the accountant. 4 This issue has been hotly debated by
8. See Vick, supra note 1, at 1342-44 (explaining role of auditor and investor/creditor
reliance on clean audits).
9. See Hagen, supra note 7, at 69-70 (defining unqualified audit opinion as one provided
by accountant to indicate that financial statements accurately represent financial position
'ithout any exceptions, reservations, or qualifications"). See generally infra text accompanying
notes 25-30 (describing four types of audit reports utilized by accountants).
10. See Siliciano, supra note 5, at 1932-33 (describing fraudulent actions by clients that
deceive auditors and are used by client to appear solvent and attractive to investors and
creditors); Vick, supra note 1, at 1336-37 & n.7 (citing Bily and noting accountant's lack of
control over clients); infra notes 184-93 and accompanying text (describing client-controlled
environment in which accountants operate). One commentator explains why financial
institutions have suffered such losses in the past several years, noting that "[d]uring the 1980s,
many businesses and financial institutions failed (and t]hese failures, in turn, had an enormous
impact on the nation's financial markets." Vick, supra note 1, at 1336 n.6 (citing Erica B. Baird,
Legal Liability Under the Expectation Gap Statements on Auditing Standards, in ACCOUNTANrS'
LIABILrIY 1991, at 63, 65 (Dan L. Goldwasser ed., 1991)).
11. SeeVick, supra note 1, at 1337 (noting that "when clients fail financially, the CPAauditor
is a prime target" to blame).
12. See Nancy Chaffee, Note, The Role and Responsibility of Accountants in Today's Society, 13
J. CoRP. L. 863, 882-83 (1988) (discussing "expectation gap" that leads public to "characterize
business failures as audit failures") (citing Joseph E. Connor, Enhancing Public Confidence in the
Accounting Profession, J. Acar., July 1986, at 76-77). The court in Bily v. Arthur Young & Co.
recognized that creditors and investors tend to treat business failures as audit failures. Bily v.
Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 763 (Cal.), modified, 3 Cal. 4th 1049a (1992). The court
explained that the accountant becomes a prime target when a creditor claims economic loss
because the accountant is the solvent party who had direct contact with the business enterprise.
Id.
13. See generally Hagen, supra note 7, at 76-87 (discussing accountants' duty of care in both
negligence and accounting contexts); Vick, supra note 1, at 1346-50 (defining "to whom an
auditor owes a duty").
14. A party is in privity with the accountant if there is a contract between the parties to
perform services. See Vick, supra note 1, at 1346-50 (discussing Ultramares v. Touche, 174 N.E.
441 (N.Y. 1931), and defining privity). A client, therefore, is in privity with the accountant
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courts and commentators since Chief Judge Cardozo's 1931 seminal
opinion in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche Niven &? Co.1" Several varying
schools of thought have emerged16 and have been adopted by
legislatures and the judiciary.17
At the core of this debate are uncertainties surrounding both the
role of accountants in performing audits as well as accountants'
liability to third parties who rely on the audit. Part I of this Comment
describes accounting and the role of the accountant in performing
audit functions. In particular, Part I details the various audit reports
because the client has contracted for the services of the accountant. Id. (discussing privity and
auditors' duty of care).
15. 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
16. Three of the four schools of thought are discussed and analyzed in this Comment. The
first is privity, which permits recovery only where a contractual relationship exists between
parties. See infra notes 57-107 and accompanying text; see alsoVick, supra note 1, at 1346-48. The
second school is the foreseeability approach, which allows any foreseeable third party to recover
against an accountant for negligence, despite the absence of privity. See infra notes 108-35 and
accompanying text; see also Vick, supra note 1, at 1348-49. The third school, the Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 552 approach, strikes a balance between the privity doctrine and the
foreseeability test by carving out limited exceptions to the privity bar. See infra notes 136-52 and
accompanying text; see alsoVick, supra note 1, at 1349-50. Finally, the federal securities laws have
also dealt with the problem of accountant liability to third parties. See generally Aulana L. Peters,
Survey of Development of Accountants'Liability Law from the Demise of Piivity to the COy for Tort Reform,
C859 ALI-ABA 877 (June 21-25, 1993). The privity requirement was "summarily dispensed with"
in federal securities statutes. Id. at 884-85. See generally Securities Act of 1933, § 11, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77(k) (1988) (stating that accountants are liable for preparing or certifying any report or
valuation that is used in connection with registration statement). When financial statements
prepared by an auditor are used in connection with public securities offerings, and are found
to be erroneous, "a market impact can result, and investors may seek to recoup their losses by
asserting securities claims, which are not necessarily subject to a privity requirement." Richard
P. Swanson, Theories of Liability, C802 ALI-ABA 1, 37 (Feb. 4, 1993). In other words, when an
accountant opines on "publicly disseminated financial statements to the investing public,"
liability may ensue. Peters, supra, at 885. The court in Bily outlined several limits to accountant
liability under the federal securities laws. Bily, 834 P.2d at 760. The factors to be considered
were whether:
(1) the accountant's liability is limited to situations in which he or she prepares or
certifies the accuracy of a portion of a registration statement and thus is aware he or
she is creating part of a communication to the public; (2) liability is limited to third
parties who actually purchase securities; (3) damage exposure is limited to the out-of-
pocket loss suffered by the purchaser and can be no greater than the amount of the
offering.
Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a), (e), (g)). One commentator explained, "the plaintiff class, the
proof of violation, and the measure of damages are statutorily defined in a manner that
enhances the accountants' ability to gauge, ex ante, its liability exposure." Siliciano, supra note
5, at 1954 n.131.
17. See, e.g., N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 7402 (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1994) (imposing liability only
where contractual relationship exists or where accountant is aware of particular parties who
intend to rely on information supplied by accountant); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-26-12 (1990)
(requiring privity of contract except where (1) conduct constitutes fraud, or (2) professional
knew of client's intent to influence particular person); Koch Indus. v. Vosko, 494 F.2d 713, 724-
25 (10th Cir. 1974) (denying recovery where plaintiff was unknown to defendant); Shofstall v.
Allied Van Lines, 455 F. Supp. 351, 360 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (denying recovery to reliant parties not
in privity with auditor where no special relationship of any kind existed between plaintiff and
accountants).
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rendered by accountants and delineates the standard of care required
of accountants as they perform audits. Part II traces the evolution of
the privity bar and its application to accountant liability, focusing on
the Utramares Doctrine. Part III details the foreseeability approach to
accountant liability, which allows all foreseeable plaintiffs to recover
for the negligence of the accountant. Part IV evaluates the Restatenzent
approach, recognizing the balance that it strikes between foreseeabili-
ty and privity. Part V analyzes the three approaches by reviewing two
recent court decisions that further shape and define accountant
liability. Part VI recommends an approach that serves both the
accounting profession and the public generally. Finally, this
Comment concludes that the Restatement is the best approach because
it promotes both responsible accounting and sophisticated lending.
I. ACCOUNTING FUNCTIONS AND PRINCIPLES
To lay a foundation for understanding accountant liability, the
following section explains the auditing process, the types of opinions
rendered by accountants, and the relevant standards of care to which
accountants must adhere. These standards include compliance with
industry principles and standards.
A. The Auditing Function
An accountant's primary function is to perform an audit of financial
statements.18 Audits seek to verify the information contained in a
company's financial statements." Auditing is a process of evaluating
data and assertions made by an entity to determine whether they
correspond. 0 Auditing procedures typically include, but are not
limited to, examining tangible assets, 21 confirming account balanc-
es,22 and observing business activities.23  The entity, in turn, often
disseminates the results of the audit to interested parties. 4
18. See WALTER G. KELL E. AL, MODERN AUDITING 33 (4th ed. 1989).
19. See id. at 5.
20. See id. (describing financial statement audits).
21. See BLACK's LAW DICrONARY 1456 (6th ed. 1990) (defining tangible assets as assets that
have physical existence, but are not held for resale). Examples of tangible assets include cash,
real estate, and equipment. Id.
22. See Hagen, supra note 7, at 66-67 n.14 (defining "confirmation of account balances" as
process of obtaining written verification from third party regarding accuracy of information that
client claims is correct).
23. Hagen, supra note 7, at 67. Examples of business activities that are observed by the
accountant may include reviewing business expenses and credit sales. Id. at 66-67.
24. See Kell, supra note 18, at 5 (noting that financial statement audits are distributed to
stockholders, creditors, regulatory agencies, and general public).
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B. Types of Audit Reports
There are four types of audit reports: (1) an unqualified opinion;
(2) a qualified opinion; (3) an adverse opinion; and (4) a disclaimer
opinion. 2' The first, the unqualified opinion,2n is the most fre-
quently issued audit report.27 It expresses the opinion of a certified
public accountant that, without exception, reservation, or qualifica-
tion, the financial statements of the audited entity give a fair
presentation of its financial position, the results of its operations, and
changes in its financial position.28  The next two types of audit
reports, qualified and adverse opinions, both indicate that the
financial statements do not comply with industry principles because
they contain material misstatements. 29  Finally, the disclaimer
opinion indicates that the financial statements fail to represent the
true economic condition of the enterprise."
C. The Accounting Standard of Care: GAAP and GAAS
1. GAAS and GAAP defined
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) 3" and Generally
25. See Hagen, supra note 7, at 69-72 (describing and defining four types of audit reports).
In addition, unless issuing an unqualified opinion, the auditor makes certain assertions that
explain the reasons for deviating from the unqualified opinion. Id. at 72-76 (describing and
explaining audit report assertions).
26. See Hagen, supra note 7, at 69-70 (discussing unqualified opinions); see also Vick, supra
note 1, at 1343-44 (discussing unqualified audit opinions). Vick explains that unqualified audit
opinions are often referred to as "clean opinions." Id. In other words, the auditor reasonably
believes that the entity's financial statements "fairly present its financial position." Id. It does
not, however, guarantee that the client's financial position is stable, profitable, or an accurate
reflection of the client's financial health. Id. The only implication of a clean audit opinion is
that the auditor has performed the service in good faith and in accordance with GAAP and
GAAS. Id. The unqualified opinion is the type of opinion most relevant to this Comment.
When such an opinion is rendered by the accountant, it indicates a healthy company. When
the unqualified opinion is erroneous, however, and the company is in fact operating at a loss,
the bank relying on this opinion before extending a loan to the company who subsequently
defaults, may look to the accountant as the solvent party from whom to recover its losses. See
Siliciano, supra note 5, at 1932-33 (noting injured third party's reliance on solvent auditor for
recovery against defaulted company).
27. Hagen, supra note 7, at 69.
28. See Hagen, supra note 7, at 69 (defining unqualified opinion).
29. See Hagen, supra note 7, at 70-71 (defining qualified and adverse opinions); infra Part
I.C.1 (outlining industry standards and principles).
30. See Hagen, supra note 7, at 71-72 (defining disclaimer opinion).
31. See HOWARD F. STErrLER, AUDITING PRINCIPLES: A SYSTEMS-BASED APPROACH 9-10 (5th
ed. 1982) (explaining generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS)). To comply with GAAS,
the auditor must follow each of 10 basic standards:
General Standards:
I. The examination is to be performed by a person or persons having adequate
technical training and proficiency as an auditor.
2. In all matters relating to the assignment. an independence in mental attitude is
to be maintained by the auditor or auditors.
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Accepted Auditing Principles (GAAP) are created by the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), a national
professional accounting organization. 2 GAAS establish the quality
of performance and the objectives that accountants are to maintain
when performing financial statement audits.3 The GAAS provide
criteria for evaluating financial statement audits and require that the
accountant render an appropriate opinion based on the accountant's
review of the financial statements.34  GAAP, on the other hand, are
the particular methods used, and acts performed, by the auditor
during an audit.3  Common auditing procedures include, but are
not limited to, accounting for cash" and observing an inventory
count.
37
3. Due professional care is to be exercised in the performance of the examination
and preparation of the report.
Standards of Field Work:
4. The work is to be adequately planned and assistants, if any, are to be properly
supervised.
5. There is to be a proper study and evaluation of the existing internal control as
a basis for reliance thereon and for the determination of the resultant extent of
the tests to which auditing procedures are to be restricted.
6. Sufficient competent evidential matter is to be obtained through inspection,
observation, inquiries and confirmations to afford a reasonable basis for an
opinion regarding the financial statements under examination.
Standards of Reporting:
7. The report shall state whether the financial statements are presented in
accordance with generally accepted principles of accounting.
8. The report shall state whether such principles have been consistently observed in
the current period in relation to the preceding period.
9. Informative disclosures in the financial statements are to be regarded as
reasonably adequate unless otherwise stated in the report.
10. The report shall either contain an expression of opinion regarding the financial
statements, taken as a whole, or an assertion to the effect that an opinion cannot
be expressed. When an overall opinion cannot be expressed, reasons therefor
should be stated. In all cases where the auditor's name is associated with financial
statements the report should contain a clear-cut indication of the character of the
auditor's examination, if any, and the degree of responsibility he is taking.
Id.
32. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) has been developing
accounting principles since 1917, in an effort to guide, strengthen, and improve the auditing
practice. STETrLER, supra note 31, at 27-28.
33. KELL, supra note 18, at 13.
34. See KELL, supra note 18, at 13 (discussing three categories of GAAS procedures: general,
field work, and reporting).
35. See KE., supra note 18, at 13 (noting that GAAP relate to GAAS reporting standards).
36. SeeLEEJ. SEIDLER&D.R. CARMICHAEL, ACcoUNTANTS' HANDBOOK 16.3-.4 (6th ed. 1981)
(stating that because each business sale "leads to a cash receipt and every expense to cash
disbursement," cash accounting is crucial to how business functions); see also KELL, supra note
18, at 13-14 (noting types of auditing procedures).
37. See Kell, supra note 18, at 13-14 (discussing relationship between auditing standards and
auditing procedures and explaining particular procedures, including observing inventory
counts).
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2. Standards and principles guiding audits
Both GAAS and GAAP include a series of statements that guide the
auditor.3 The accountant's duty of care is satisfied by performing
the audit in accordance with GAAS and conforming to GAAP.19 In
fact, an accountant will generally satisfy the requisite duty of care and
escape liability for negligence when complying in good faith with
GAAP and GAAS.4°
D. Economic and Commercial Realities for the Accountant
Although an accountant needs to satisfy only a minimum standard
of care under GAAS and GAAP in order to issue an unqualified
opinion, commercial realities require accountants to perform
additional roles in an audit. For example, clients generally retain an
accountant to perform an audit and provide an unqualified opinion
that indicates, without exception, that the financial statements of the
clients fairly present their financial position." These opinions are
often, if not exclusively, used by businesses to appear more attractive
to lenders and investors.42 Accordingly, the AICPA has noted that
38. KELL, supra note 18, at 14. One such statement is that the audit must be performed
and prepared with due professional care. Id.
39. See Hagen, supra note 7, at 78 (discussing accounting standard of care).
40. See Hagen, supra note 7, at 78-79 n.85 (reaching this conclusion by evaluating decisions
in which CPA incurred criminal liability for willful violations of Securities Acts of 1933 or 1934:
SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 590 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1979); Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank
v. Swartz, Bresenoff, Yavner &Jacobs, 455 F.2d 847 (4th Cir. 1972); United States v. Simon, 425
F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970)).
41. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (defining unqualified audit opinion).
42. See Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 751 (Cal.) (describing unqualified audit
report of CPA firm as "necessary condition precedent to attracting the kind and level of outside
funds essential to the client's financial growth and survival"), modified, 3 Cal. 4th 1049a (1992);
Siliciano, supra note 5, at 1932. Siliciano explains:
In the first instance, this unqualified opinion serves as an assurance to the client that
its own perception of its financial health is valid and that its accounting systems are
reliable. The audit, however, frequently plays a second major role: it assists the client
in convincing third parties that it is safe to extend credit or invest in the client.
Id. Third parties may be creditors, investors, or suppliers, who either engage in frequent
business relations with the auditor's client or have little prior association with the client. Id.
If a client is in need of financial assistance and this assistance is vital to the continuation of its
enterprise, the client may fraudulently alter its financial records "in an effort to obtain... funds
from creditors and investors." Id. Accordingly, the financial statements that are audited "may
present a materially inaccurate picture of the client's financial health." Id. If the auditor fails
to detect the fraud, yet issues an unqualified opinion, third parties who rely on the representa-
tions made in the audit reports are liable to suffer economic loss and seek redress against the
client. Id. The client, however, is likely insolvent, so "[t]he injured party's focus therefore
naturally shifts to the accountant, whose unqualified opinion regarding the client's financial
statements may have encouraged the third party's involvement with the client." Id. at 1932-33.
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an auditor has a responsibility not only to clients, but also to investors,
creditors, and the larger business and financial communities.'
The U.S. Supreme Court has also recognized that the accountant
serves a public function when acting as an auditor. In United States v.
Arthur Young & Co.,' the Court denied work product protection to
an auditor's work papers4' requiring that the auditor disclose the
papers to the Internal Revenue Service.4" The Court held that when
an auditor depicts a corporation's financial status, she "assumes a
public responsibility transcending any employment relationship with
the client."'47  The auditor "owes ultimate allegiance to the
corporation's creditors and stockholders, as well as to the investing
public."4" In light of an auditor's universal duties, the Court in
Arthur Young labeled the accountant a "public watchdog."49 Conse-
quently, an auditor's responsibilities extend well beyond mere
adherence to GAAS and GAAP, which dictate only accounting
methods and evaluation criteria. Arthur Young thus creates the
commercial reality that an auditor has a duty to all entities associated
with the client, regardless how tenuous that association may be.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: COMMON LAW
LIABILITY- ULTRAMARES AND THE PRIVITY BAR
Based on the economic and commercial realities of the audit
function and the role of the auditor, several schools of thought have
emerged with respect to an accountant's liability as an auditor.
Jurisdictions apply one of three rules5" to determine whether
nonclients can sue an auditor for negligently preparing financial
43. 2 AICPA Prof. Stds. (CCH) ET § 53.01 (1992).
44. 465 U.S. 805 (1984). In this case, Arthur Young & Co. was retained byAmerada Hess
Corporation to review its financial statements in accordance with federal securities laws. United
States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 804, 808 (1984). In preparing the audit, the accountant
verified the corporation's tax liabilities. Id. A routine IRS audit, however, revealed that the
corporation had made some questionable payments. Id. Thus, pursuant to § 7602 of the
Internal Revenue Code, the IRS issued an administrative summons requiring the accountant's
work papers. Id. at 808-09. The corporation advised the accountant to deny the Government's
request in the interest of preserving the confidentiality of the work papers. Id. at 809. In
reversing the decision of the court of appeals, United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d
211 (2d Cir. 1982), rev'd, 465 U.S. 804 (1984), the Supreme Court held that the accountant's
work product was not protected because the accountant owed a public interest responsibility to
the corporation's creditors and stockholders. Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 818, 821.
45. Id. at 818, 821.
46. Id. at 821.
47. Id. at 817.
48. Id. at 818.
49. Id. (noting that "public watchdog" function requires accountant to remain wholly
independent of client and maintain "complete fidelity to the public trust").
50. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (setting out theories of liability).
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statements: (1) the privity rule, which generally allows only clients to
recover;" (2) the foreseeability approach, which allows any reason-
ably foreseeable party who relies on the audit to recover;5 2 and (3)
the approach embodied in section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, allowing only intended beneficiaries to recover, provided that
the auditor had knowledge of the intended beneficiaries." While
various jurisdictions have followed the privity rule, 4 relatively few
jurisdictions follow the foreseeability approach.5 The majority of
jurisdictions, however, have adopted the Restatement, finding that it
strikes an equitable balance between foreseeability and privity.
56
51. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (defining privity doctrine); infra notes 57-107
and accompanying text.
52. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (defining foreseeability approach); infra notes
108-35 and accompanying text.
53. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (outlining Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552
approach); infra notes 136-52 and accompanying text.
54. See, e.g., McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1202 (3d Cir. 1979) (agreeing that
iltramares rule should be applied under Delaware law); Koch Indus. v. Vosko, 494 F.2d 713, 724-
25 (10th Cir. 1974) (endorsing trial court's use of L1ltramares standard); Stevens Indus. v. Haskins
& Sells, 438 F.2d 357, 359-60 (10th Cir. 1971) (affirming trial court's use of privity standard);
Toro Co. v. Krouse, Kern & Co., 644 F. Supp. 986, 994 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (declaring continued
adherence to privity standards established in U(tramares and Credit Alliance), affd, 827 F.2d 155
(7th Cir. 1987); Robertson v. White, 633 F. Supp. 954, 970-71 (W.D. Ark. 1986) (declaring that
Arkansas courts continue to use privity standard); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Parente,
Randolph, Orlando, Carey & Assocs., 642 F. Supp. 38, 41 (M.D. Pa. 1985) (holding that privity
is required to maintain professional negligence action); Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. First Bancorp
of Idaho, 772 P.2d 720, 722 (Idaho 1989) (applying Credit Alliance criteria in determining
whether accountant owed duty to noncontractual third parties); Cashman v. Coopers & Lybrand,
623 N.E.2d 907, 911 (11. App. Ct. 1993) (determining that no contractual duty existed between
accountants and plaintiffis and affirming dismissal by trial court); Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Kennedy
& Coe, 441 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Neb. 1989) (finding that accountants would not be liable to banks
in negligence absent fraud or other facts establishing duty to banks); Ward v. Ernst & Young,
435 S.E.2d 628, 631 (Va. 1993) (declining to carve out exception to privity requirement). In
four states, the privity rule has been enacted by statute. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-302 (Michie
Supp. 1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 225, § 450/30.1 (Smith-Hurd 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 1402
(1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-26-12 (Supp. 1993).
55. See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 514 So. 2d 315, 322 (Miss.
1987) (finding auditors "liable to reasonably foreseeable users of the audit" who detrimentally
rely on financial statements obtained for proper business purposes); Rosenblum v. Adler, 461
A.2d 138, 153 (NJ. 1983) (promulgating rule that independent auditors have duty to all
reasonably foreseeable users of audits only if recipients of financial statements provided by
audited company rely on such statements pursuant to proper business purposes); Citizens State
Bank v. Timm, 335 N.W.2d 361, 366 (Wis. 1983) (concluding that mere lack of privity alone is
insufficient to bar negligence actions by reliant third parties against accountants, and stating that
liability extends to all reasonably foreseeable plaintiffs).
56. As of February 1994, Restatement § 552 had been adopted in 23 states: Alaska, Selden
v. Burnett, 754 P.2d 256, 259 (Alaska 1988) (finding that where company offering investment
is bankrupt and investors sue accountant, "accountant owes a duty of care to third parties only
if the accountant specifically intends the third parties to invest relying on his advice, and only
if he makes his intent known"); Alabama, Boykin v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 639 So. 2d 504, 509-
10 (Ala. 1994) (contending that Alabama must move forward and join the other jurisdictions
in adopting Restatement); Florida, First Fla. Bank v. Max Mitchell & Co., 558 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1990);
Georgia, Badische Corp. v. Caylor, 356 S.E.2d 198, 200 n.2 (Ga. 1987) (disallowing recovery by
creditors where accountants, who prepared financial statements for debtor, failed to reveal that
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A. Historical Background of Privity
The "privity" doctrine developed in England at common law as early
as the 1840s when the Court of Exchequer presided over the case of
Winterbottom v. Wright.17 In that case, the defendant had violated a
contract to keep a mail coach in repair." The court held that the
defendant was not liable to a third party who had suffered injuries
caused by the mail coach's latent defects.59 The court reasoned,
"Unless we confine the operation of such contracts as this to the
parties who entered into them, the most absurd and outrageous
consequences, to which I can see no limit, would ensue."6 ° Because
the plaintiff was not in privity of contract with the defendant, the
court concluded that no liability existed. From this holding, the
general rule of privity developed. 2
B. The Ultramares Doctrine
Ninety years after the English Winterbottom decision, the highest
court of New York, in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche Niven & Co.,
various banks had secured interest in debtor's inventory); Hawaii, In re Hawaii Corp., 567 F.
Supp. 609, 617 (D. Haw. 1983) (applying § 552 in determining accountant's negligence); Iowa,
Pahre v. Auditor of State, 422 N.W.2d 178 (Iowa 1988); Kentucky, Ingram Indus. v. Nowicki, 527
F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ky. 1981); Louisiana, First Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. Monco Agency, 911
F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1990); Michigan, Law Offices of LawrenceJ. Stockler v. Rose, 436 N.W.2d
70 (Mich. App. 1989); Minnesota, Bonhiver v. Graff, 248 N.W.2d 291 (Minn. 1976); Missouri,
MidAmerican Bank & Trust Co. v. Harrison, 851 S.W.2d 563,564 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); Montana,
Thayer v. Hicks, 793 P.2d 784 (Mont. 1990); Nebraska, Seedkem Inc. v. Safranek, 466 F. Supp.
340, 344 (D. Neb. 1979) (evaluating liability theories and preferring Restatement approach); New
Hampshire, Spherex, Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 451 A.2d 1308 (N.H. 1982); North
Carolina, Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 367 S.E.2d 609, 611 (N.C. 1988)
(concluding that scope of liability is best measured by Restatement approach); North Dakota,
Bunge Corp. v. Eide, 372 F. Supp. 1058 (D.N.D. 1974); Ohio, Haddon View Inv. Co. v. Coopers
& Lybrand, 436 N.E.2d 212 (Ohio 1982); Oregon, In re Melridge, Inc. Securities Litigation, No.
88-1226-JV, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15363 (D. Or. Dec. 14, 1989); Pennsylvania, Sharp v. Coopers
& Lybrand, 457 F. Supp. 879, 886 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (refusing to endorse either foreseeability or
privity approach), afid, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982); Rhode
Island, Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968), Tennessee, Bethlehem Steel
Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney, 822 S.W.2d 592, 595 (Tenn. 1991) (modifying liability of national
accounting firm using Restatement approach); Texas, Blue Bell, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell
& Co., 715 S.W.2d 408, 413 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (applying § 552); and West Virginia, First Nat'l
Bank of Bluefield v. Crawford, 386 S.E.2d 310, 313 (W. Va. 1989) (finding that majority view
provides middle ground and Restatement is most appropriate).
57. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
58. Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 402-03 (1842).
59. Id. at 406.
60. Id. at 405.
61. Id.; see Credit Alliance Corp. v. ArthurAndersen & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110, 115 (N.Y. 1985)
(describing Lord Abinger's remarks in Winterbottom); Winterbottom, 152 Eng. Rep. at 405.
62. See Credit Alliance 483 N.E.2d at 115 (noting that, after Winterbottom, privity doctrine
developed into general rule that remained predominate well into 20th century); see alsoW. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 93 (1984) (noting that privity rule
developed from broad interpretation of dicta in Winterbottom).
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considered whether an auditor was liable for negligence to unknown
third parties with whom he had not contracted. 3 Chief Judge
Cardozo, writing for the court, applied the privity doctrine to deny
recovery to a nonclient who alleged that he had lost money as a result
of his reliance on an auditor's negligent certifications.64 The
defendant, Touche, Niven & Company, a firm of public accountants,
was employed by Fred Stern & Company to prepare and certify a
balance sheet that was to reflect the condition of Stem's business.
65
Stern regularly obtained outside financing to maintain its operations,
and needed the balance sheet certification to present to banks,
creditors, and investors. 6  Knowing that Stern often obtained
outside financing, the accountant provided Stern with thirty-two
copies of the certification.67 At no time, however, did Touche have
knowledge of the specific parties to whom Stem would distribute the
certification. 6' Although the certified balance sheet indicated that
Stern was operating with capital and surplus intact, Stem was, in fact,
insolvent.69  Stern had fraudulently created fictitious assets and the
audit did not uncover the discrepancies." Relying on Touche's
certification, the Ultramares Corporation extended loans to Stern that
remained unpaid once Stem declared bankruptcy.7  When
Ultramares was unable to recover its losses from Stem, it sued Touche
for negligence and fraud.72
Although the court found that the auditors were negligent in failing
to uncover Stem's fictitious entries," it did not find that fact
sufficient to establish liability. Rather, Judge Cardozo focused on
whether Touche owed the same duty of care to Ultramares as it did
to Stern.74 According to the court, Touche owed some duty to
63. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche Niven & Co., 174 N.E. 441, 443 (N.Y. 1931).
64. See id. at 445-48.





70. Id. at 443.
71. Id.
72. Id. The court did not find that the defendants had committed fraud. According to the
court, had the accountant committed fraud by knowingly intending to engage in deception, his
duty of care would be expanded and liability would exist even absent a contractual relationship.
Id. at 444; see also Siliciano, supra note 5, at 1934-35 (analyzing Ultramares Doctrine).
73. Utramares, 174 N.E. at 444. According to the court, on closer examination, a cautious
accountant could have discovered both discrepancies in Stem's financial ledgers amounting to
a suspicious inflation of its inventory, and questionable invoices that should have served to "cast
discredit upon the business and the books." Id.
74. See id. (noting that Touche owed Stern legal duty to make certification without fraud
and in accordance with stated accounting principles).
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creditors and investors who were given copies of the certification. v5
Although this duty clearly included liability for fraud, Chief Judge
Cardozo reasoned that "[i]f liability for negligence exist[ed], a
thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to detect a theft or forgery
beneath the cover of deceptive entries .... would expose accountants
to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time
to an indeterminate class."
76
In recognizing the potential for unlimited accountant liability, the
court in Ultramares reexamined its prior holding in MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co. 77 In MacPherson, the court had adopted a foreseeability of
harm test to determine tort liability, which assigned liability irrespec-
tive of the parties' contractual status. 8 The MacPherson standard was
thus substantially more liberal than the privity doctrine in permitting
findings of liability.7' Although in Ultramares, Chief Judge Cardozo
recognized the potential harm of a defective audit, he opted for a
more restrictive alternative to the MacPherson rule, ° noting the
"indefinite and wide"'" number of possible parties to whom the
accountant could be liable under the foreseeability test.82 The court
in Ultramares reasoned that liability for negligence may arise from
contract performance between the parties to the contract.83  In
short, when faced with a critical choice between expanding or
75. Id.
76. Id. The accountant is retained by the client to review prepared financial statements
from which the accountant issues an opinion as to whether these statements are representative
of the client's financial status. Siliciano, supra note 5, at 1931. This process is very client
controlled. See infra notes 184-93 and accompanying text (discussing reasons why liability is
disproportionate to fault). "Financial statements do not contain records of every financial
transaction and are not meant to include all information investors and creditors may find
pertinent." Vick, supra note 1, at 1340; id. at 1340 n.43 (citing United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d
757 (9th Cir.) (stating that purpose of financial statement is to summarize financial position, not
to provide all information third parties might want to know before making loan or investment
decisions), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981 (1978)).
77. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). In Machersn, the defendant was a car manufacturer who
sold an automobile to a retailer, who in turn resold it to the plaintiff. MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1051 (N.Y. 1916). The plaintiff was injured when one of the car's
wheels collapsed. Id. The court was asked to determine "whether the defendant owed a duty
of care and vigilance to any" person other than the immediate purchaser, here the retailer. Id.
With one judge dissenting, the court held that, due to the dangerous nature of an automobile,
the defendant owed a duty to appropriately inspect each car carefully, and that this duty
extended to all foreseeable plaintiffs because the defendant was aware that the original buyer
was a car dealer "who bought to resell." Id. at 1053, 1055.
78. Id. at 1053; see also Siliciano, supra note 5, at 1934.
79. See Siliciano, supra note 5, at 1935.
80. Siliciano, supra note 5, at 1935.
81. Vitramares, 174 N.E. at 442.
82. See id. ("The range of transactions on which a certificate of audit might be expected to
play a part was as indefinite and wide as the possibilities of the business that was mirrored in
summary.").
83. Id. at 448.
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restricting liability, Cardozo chose to depart from the court's earlier
holdings and limit liability.
8 4
The rule adopted in Ultramares has been widely applied. Today,
many jurisdictions limit recovery to contractual parties.85 More
recently, however, and despite the privity requirement outlined in
Ultramares, New York's highest court has not consistently required that
plaintiffs in suits against accountants ground their claim in a
contractual relationship. For instance, in White v. Guarente,6 one of
forty limited partners sued the auditor who prepared audit reports
and tax returns for the partnership. 7 The plaintiff claimed that the
auditor had committed professional negligence by failing to disclose
that two general partners had withdrawn funds in violation of the
partnership agreement.88 The court held that the accountant had
a duty to the plaintiff to exercise due care when preparing the
partnership's tax returns because the limited partners relied on the
returns to prepare their personal tax returns.89
The court in White distinguished Ultramares on the ground that "the
services of the accountant were not extended to a faceless or
84. Siliciano, supra note 5, at 1935. The New York court's ruling in Ultramares was not
absolute and did not overrule its earlier decision in Glanzerv. Shepard, where relief was granted
to a party not in privity with the defendant. Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 277 (N.Y. 1922).
In G!anzer, the defendant, a public weigher who provided a seller of beans with an erroneous
certification of weight, was found liable to the buyer of the certified goods for the excess
amount paid as a result of the inflated weight certification. Id. at 275. The court found that,
due to the close proximity of the defendant's purpose of public weighing, the defendant owed
a duty to the buyer to weigh the goods carefully regardless of whether a contract existed
between the weigher and buyer. Id. at 276.
In distinguishing Glanzer from Utramares, Cardozo reasoned that because the bond between
the defendant and the third-party plaintiff was so close in Glanzer, unlike in Ultramares, it
approached privity and was an exception to the rule stated in Ultramares. Ultramares, 174 N.E.
at 446. More specifically, Glanzer represented a situation in which the "transmission of the
certificate to another was not merely one possibility among many, but the 'end and aim of the
transaction.'" Id. at 445. On the contrary, in Ultramares, "the [auditor's] service was primarily
for the benefit of the Stem Company, a convenient instrumentality for use in the development
of the business, and only incidentally or collaterally for the use of those to whom Stern and his
associates might exhibit it thereafter." Id. at 446.
85. See supra note 54 (providing examples ofjurisdictions that adhere to privity doctrine).
86. 372 N.E.2d 315 (N.Y. 1977). In White, a partnership agreement stipulated that at the
end of each fiscal year a certified public accountant would be designated by the general partners
and retained to perform an audit of the partnership's books and records. White v. Guarente,
372 N.E.2d 315,317 (N.Y. 1977). The plaintiff, a limited partner, sued the general partners and
the accountant for, inter alia, inaccurate and misleading information contained in the audit
reports and financial statements made in violation of the partnership agreement. Id. at 318.
The NewYork Supreme Court, Special Term, dismissed the actionagainst the auditor for failure
to state a cause of action and the court of appeals affirmed, 388 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (1976) (mem.).
Subsequently, the court of appeals reversed, holding that Ultramares'privity requirements would
not bar liability because the plaintiff was a member of a known, fixed, and limited class for
whom the audit was prepared. White, 372 N.E.2d at 318-19.
87. White, 372 N.E.2d at 317.
88. Id. at 317-18.
89. Id. at 319.
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unresolved class of persons, but rather to a known group possessed of
vested rights [the partners], marked by a definable limit and made up
of certain components."" The court further noted that the audit
and tax return information was only one part of the auditor's
responsibility in the transaction and allegiance to the partners was
equally important.9
C. The New York Court of Appeals Follows Ultramares
Although White represented a slight departure from the rule in
Ultramares, it was a fact-specific variation not intended to modify the
holding in Ultramares. In Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen &
Co.,92 another case involving accountant liability to third parties, the
New York court reframed the law in light of both Ultramares and
White." The plaintiff, Credit Alliance Corporation, as a condition to
extending credit, insisted that L.B. Smith, Inc. provide audited
financial statements before it would provide Smith with financing.94
Accordingly, Smith employed defendant, Arthur Andersen, to perform
the audit.95 Credit Alliance extended credit to Smith in reliance on
the audit, which depicted Smith as a healthy company.9" Shortly
thereafter, Smith defaulted on millions of dollars in obligations to the
plaintiff and declared bankruptcy.97 Credit Alliance sued Arthur
Andersen for negligently overstating Smith's assets in the audit.9
The court found that there was insufficient evidence of direct
communications and personal meetings between Credit Alliance and
Arthur Andersen to satisfy Ultramares' privity requirement.99 The
court in Credit Alliance also took the opportunity to set out three
criteria for determining accountant liability to noncontractual third
90. Id. at 318.
91. Id. at 319.
92. 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 1985).
93. See Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110, 115 (N.Y. 1985)
(restating and elaborating on continued adherence to strict privity requirement instituted in
Utramares). But see hite, 372 N.E.2d at 318-19 (finding accountant liability in certain
circumstances to identifiable group of limited partners).
94. Credit Alliance, 483 N.E.2d at 111.
95. Id.
96. Id. The initial audit, alleged to conform with GAAS, covered the years 1976 and 1977.
Id. Based on these statements, Credit Alliance supplied Smith with substantial sums of money
on various occasions. Id. It was only after the second audit, in 1979, that additional financing
was provided. Id.
97. Id. at 111-12.
98. Id. at 111.
99. See id. at 119-20 (contrasting European Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Strauhs & Kaye, 102
A.D.2d 776 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984), where "[t]he parties' direct communications and personal
meetings resulted in a nexus between them sufficiently approaching privity under the principles
of Ultramares').
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parties who rely on erroneous financial reports. First, the accountants
performing the financial reports must have been aware that such
statements were to be used for a certain purpose or purposes.'00
For example, the accountant must have known the financial state-
ments would be disseminated to attract third-party investors. Second,
the accountant must have known that the third party intended to rely
on the financial statements. 1 ' Third, there must have been some
conduct by the accountants that linked them to the third party and
gave rise to at least an inference that the accountant understood that
the third party was relying."2
Applying the facts to the above criteria, the court in Credit Alliance
held that the accountants were not liable because the plaintiff had
failed to present evidence demonstrating that Arthur Andersen had
knowledge that the audit would be distributed to it, and because it
had failed to demonstrate that it had relied on the audit in extending
credit to Smith."0 3 In reiterating the requirement of a "contractual
relationship or its equivalent,"0 4 the court in Credit Alliance did not
find that the "end and aim" of the audit was to satisfy the lender.'0 5
Accordingly, the auditor was not deemed to have been on notice for
the purposes of the court's criteria.' °6 Thus, the court in Credit
Alliance maintained and reaffirmed New York's privity jurispru-
dence.107
100. Id. at 118.
101. Id.
102. Id. Although these criteria permit a more flexible interpretation of the privity doctrine
with respect to accountants' liability, "they do not represent a departure from the principles
articulated in Ultramares [and] Glanzer... but, rather, they are intended to preserve the wisdom
and policy set forth therein." Id.; see also Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 754 (Cal.)
(discussing rule promulgated in Credit Alliance), modified, 3 Cal. 4th 1049a (1992); Swanson, supra
note 16, at 14-15 (noting that court in Credit Alliance rejected opportunity to expand liability).
As recently asJanuary 1993, a federal district court in NewYork followed the rules articulated
in Ultramares and Credit Alliance. See Ahmed v. Trupin, 809 F. Supp. 1100 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). In
Ahmed, investors who offered interests in commercial real estate sued the accounting firm that
performed audits for the offering corporation for misrepresenting the soundness of the
investment properties. Id. at 1103. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to allege "any
nexus between them and the ... Defendants from which the accountant's understanding of
Plaintiff's reliance could be inferred." Id. at 1105. Therefore, the plaintiffs did not pass the
third prong of the Credit Alliance test for the same reason that "the privity exception in Ultramares
was limited to cases of direct, known reliance." Id.
103. Credit Allianc4 483 N.E.2d at 119.
104. Id. at 117 (quoting State St. Trust Co. v. Ernst, 15 N.E.2d 416, 418 (N.Y. 1938)).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 119-20; see also Swanson, supra note 16, at 14-15 (contrasting holdings in Credit
Alliance and European American Bank in finding that no evidence of knowledge existed in
former).
107. See Credit Alliance, 483 N.E.2d at 119.
270
1994] AUDITOR LIABILITY
III. THE FORESEEABILITy APPROACH
Some jurisdictions entirely disregard the privity approach of
Ultramares1°8 and allow any foreseeable plaintiff to recover.109  This
approach is far broader, and presently only New Jersey," Mississip-
pi,"' and Wisconsin" 2 apply it in cases involving accountants."1
In Rosenblum v. Adler,"4 the New Jersey Supreme Court applied
the foreseeability approach in an action for negligent misrepresenta-
tion.1 15  In that case, stock purchasers argued that they had relied
on audits of a corporation's financial statements.116 In the relevant
transaction, the purchasers acquired common stock in conjunction
with the sale of their business to the corporation.117  When the
financial statements were found to be fraudulent, and the stock
worthless, the purchasers sued the accountants."' The NewJersey
Supreme Court noted that liability would exist under both the
Utramares doctrine'1 9 and the Restatement approach 120 only when
there was a relationship between the auditor and the plaintiff third
108. Despite the absence of privity, recovery is allowed in several jurisdictions. See, e.g.,
Larsen v. United Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 300 N.W.2d 281, 286-87 (Iowa 1981) (expressly
departing from strict rule of Ultramares); Spherex, Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 451 A.2d 1308,
1311 (N.H. 1982) (expressing disfavor with privity doctrine in personal injury cases and
distinguishing privity requirement to recovering in financial loss actions); Haddon View Inv. Co.
v. Coopers & Lybrand, 436 N.E.2d 212, 214 (Ohio 1982) (rejecting privity limitations in
recovery).
109. This approach was proposed in 1983 by Justice Howard Wiener. See Howard Wiener,
Common Law Liability of the Certified Public Accountant for Negligent Misrepresentation, 20 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 233, 236 (1983) (questioning rationale of Ultramares and suggesting that social,
economic, and legal considerations now require accountants to be judged by same standards
applied to other professionals); see also Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 755 (Cal.)
(citingJustice Wiener's article and expanding on his conclusion that accountant liability based
on foreseeable injury would serve dual functions of compensation for injury and deterring
negligent conduct), modified, 3 Cal. 4th 1049a (1994).
110. See Rosenblum v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 145 (N.J. 1983) (stating that privity is not
"salutary predicate" to prevent recovery and that reasonably foreseeable consequences of
negligent act should be actionable).
111. SeeTouche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 514 So. 2d 315, 322 (Miss. 1987)
(citing Rosenblum and holding that independent auditor is liable to reasonably foreseeable users
of audit who detrimentally rely on financial statement).
112. See Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 335 N.W.2d 361, 366 (Wis. 1983)
(concluding that liability will be imposed on accountants for foreseeable injuries resulting from
their negligent acts, unless recovery is denied on public policy grounds).
113. Accord Vick, supra note 1, at 1348 (noting that three states apply foreseeability approach;
and explaining that, generally, foreseeability permits recovery if plaintiff's harm was reasonably
foreseeable result of defendant's conduct).
114. 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983).
115. Rosenblum v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 143-45 (N.J. 1983).
116. Id. at 140.
117. Id. at 140-41.
118. Id. at 140.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 63-84 (discussing (ltramares doctrine).
120. See infra text accompanying notes 136-52 (discussing Restatement approach).
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party.21  In addition, the court emphasized that, absent public
policy considerations, privity should not be a prerequisite for
recovery.122  Further, the court reasoned that the critical function
accountants serve in society warranted expanded liability.2 3
The court analogized damages for physical injury to damages for
economic loss, questioning, "If recovery for defective products may
include economic loss, why should such loss not be compensable if
caused by negligent misrepresentation?" 4 The court asserted that
assigning the auditor a duty to all foreseeable recipients of the audit
was necessary to protect the public."z This policy emphasized the
deterrent effect of imposing more expansive liability 2 6 The court
specifically noted that "[t] his might entail setting up stricter standards
and applying closer supervision, which should tend to reduce the
number of instances in which liability would ensue." 127 Addressing
the dangers of broader liability, the court in Rosenblum argued that
there was no reason that accountants could not purchase malpractice
insurance. 
128
Mississippi has similarly followed the foreseeability approach. In
Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Insurance Co.,129 the Mississip-
pi Court applied a state statute that permits actions by parties not in
privity. °  Therefore, the court could not follow Cardozo's
Ultramares decision. Nor, in the court's view, was the Restatement
applicable, as the Restatement differed from privity only by the
particular arbitrary limit it placed on the class of potential plain-
tiffs.'' Accordingly, the court found that the best rule was the
121. Rosenblum, 461 A.2d at 145.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 147.
125. Id. at 151.
126. The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Citizens Bank v. Timm Schmidt & Co., similarly
reasoned that if third parties who rely on the accuracy of financial statements could not recover,
accountant's negligence would go undeterred and the general cost of credit would increase.
Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 335 N.W.2d 361,365 (Wis. 1983). The court stated
that the cost of credit to the general public would increase because creditors would either have
to "absorb the cost of bad loans made in reliance on faulty information or hire independent
accountants to verify the information received." Id.
127. Rosenblum, 461 F.2d at 152.
128. Id. at 151.
129. 514 So. 2d 315 (Miss. 1987).
130. Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 514 So. 2d 315, 321 (Miss. 1987);
see Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-20 (Supp. 1993) ("In all causes of action ... for economic loss
brought on account of negligence, ... privity shall not be a requirement to maintain said
action.").
131. See Touche Ross & Co., 514 So. 2d at 321-22 (stating that audit's purpose solely defines
auditor's liability to third parties).
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foreseeability approach, which maximized protection for both
parties.1
3 2
Proponents of the foreseeability approach argue that accountant
liability should be determined by the same principles as apply to other
tortfeasors 33  The theory behind holding accountants liable to all
reasonably foreseeable injured parties is to compensate the injured
plaintiff, while deterring negligence in auditing.3 4  Further, the
accountant, the financier, and the public-at-large will benefit when an
auditor's liability is measured by the foreseeability standard because
the auditor's incentive for accuracy is greatly heightened, thereby
increasing reliability.3 5
IV. THE RESTATEMENT APPROACH
Increasing dissatisfaction with both the broad implications of the
foreseeability approach and the restrictive nature of the Ultramares
doctrine have led courts and commentators to adopt an intermediate
approach. 36  This approach is embodied in section 552 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts.137  Section 552 imposes third-party
liability on professionals who supply inaccurate information to their
clients where the information is reasonably relied on by nonclients,
such as creditors, banks, investors, and shareholders.13' Liability is
132. Id. at 322-23. The court stated that a rule based on foreseeability "protects third parties,
who request, receive and rely on a financial statement, while it also protects the auditor from
an unlimited number of potential users." Id. at 322.
133. See generally Wiener, supra note 109.
134. Wiener, supra note 109, at 260.
135. Wiener, supra note 109, at 260.
136. See Bilyv. ArthurYoung & Co., 834 P.2d 745,759 (Cal.) (explaining that Restatement rule
has been for many courts satisfactory compromise between traditional privity approach and
"specter of unlimited liability"), modified 3 Cal. 4th 1049a (1992).
137. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1976) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]; see
Swanson, supra note 16, at 25-26 (stating that Restatement approach is broader than New York
approach, which requires knowledge by accountant of specific person who relies on financial
report, but narrower than New Jersey approach, where accountant may be liable to all
reasonably foreseeable users of financial report); Vick, supra note 1, at 1349 (explaining § 552
of Restatement).
There have been no proposals to change § 552 in the Restatement (Third) of Torts. The
American Law Institute has embarked on revisions of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Geoffrey
C. Hazard, Jr., Annual Report of the American Law Institute, 21 A.L.I. 7 (May 17-20, 1994). The
proposals address only two topics: products liability and apportionment of liability. Id. This
Comment falls into neither category.
138. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 137, § 552(1). Section 552(1) provides:
One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or any other
transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the
guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss
caused to them by theirjustiflable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise
reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information.
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limited, however, to those relying third-party recipients of the audit
who are known to the auditor.
139
Under the Restatement, when an individual detrimentally relies on
negligently prepared commercial information, and the information's
supplier (or the entity that prepared that information) knew that the
information would be provided to that individual, the supplier is
liable.14° Even more broadly, an auditor need not know that the
audit will be disseminated to particular creditors, investors, and
banks. 141  The Restatement makes clear that it is enough that the
auditor be aware that third parties exist who may "reasonably be
expected sooner or later to have access to the information and
foreseeably to take some action in reliance upon it.'
42
The following illustration further demonstrates the intention of
Restatement section 552:
Auditor is retained by Company to conduct an annual audit and to
provide an opinion on Company's financial statements. Company
does not inform Auditor of any intended use for the statements,
but Auditor is aware that it is customary for financial statements
and audits to be used in a wide variety of financial transactions
involving creditors, investors, banks, and shareholders. In fact,
Company uses the financial statements and accompanying audit
certification to provide evidence of its stability to obtain a loan from
Bank. Auditor, although acting in good faith, was negligent in
preparing the audit and certified a healthy Company, when, in fact,
Company was insolvent. In reliance upon the certification and
financial statements, Bank made a $10 million loan to Company on
which Company subsequently defaulted. Company then declares
bankruptcy. Auditor is not liable to Bank for pecuniary loss.
143
139. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 137, § 552(2)-(3). The Restatement provides that:
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in Subsection (1) is limited
to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and
guidance he intends to supply the information or he knows that the recipient intends
to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the information to
influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially similar transaction.
(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty to give the information extends
to loss suffered by any of the class of persons for whose benefit the duty is created, in
any of the transactions in which it is intended to protect them.
Id.; see also Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873, 879 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971)
(holding that under § 552, accountant may be held liable to third parties who rely on financial
statements where accountant fails to exercise ordinary care and third party suffers financial loss
or damage because of such reliance).
140. RESTATEMENT, supra note 137, § 552 cmt. a.
141. RESTATEMENT, supra note 137, § 552 cmt. h.
142. RESTATEMENT, supra note 137, § 552 cmt. h.
149. RESTATEMENT, supra note 137, § 552 cmt. h, illus. 10.
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In the above example, Bank is unable to recover its losses from
Auditor, who did not know that Company intended to disseminate the
audit to third parties. Although section 552 does not require that
Auditor have actual knowledge of the particular third parties,
1"
third-party liability exists only if Company specified that it required
the services of Auditor for the purpose of obtaining financing.
Absent such a manifestation, Auditor is not liable to Bank, though
Bank negligently conducted the audit and certification, and Bank
justifiably relied on Auditor's representation.'45 Thus, the Restate-
ment limits accountant liability to parties to whom the work product
is intended and disseminated, provided the auditor knew the work
product would be disseminated and to whom."'
Section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts is broader than both
the Ultramares doctrine and the rule outlined in Credit Alliance, which
require that the auditor possess actual knowledge that a specific third
party will rely on the financial information supplied. 47 Yet, section
552 is narrower than the foreseeability approach, which extends
liability to all reasonably foreseeable recipients of the accountant's
work product.
148
In the above illustration, Auditor would be liable to Bank under the
foreseeability approach because Auditor knew that the audit and
certification of financial statements were customarily used by
Company to receive financing. Therefore, it was reasonably foresee-
able that Bank was an intended recipient of the information supplied
by Auditor. On the other hand, applying the privity requirement,
Auditor would escape liability because it lacked actual knowledge of
the intended recipient.
Recognizing that section 552 achieves a middle ground with respect
to auditors' liability to third parties, many jurisdictions have adopted
144. RESTATEMENT, supra note 137, § 552 cmt. h.
145. RESTATEMENT, supra note 137, § 552 cmt. h (stating that § 552 makes auditor liable only
to those persons for whose benefit and guidance audit is supplied). This would be a different
case if the Accountant had prepared the audit fraudulently. See id. § 531 (explaining that in
case of fraudulent representation, liability extends to any person whom maker of representation
has reason to expect will rely on it).
146. See Swanson, supra note 16, at 26 ("Section 552 of the Restatement limits liability to a
small class of persons for whose intended use and benefit the accountant's information was
supplied.").
147. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 137, § 552 cmt. h ("It is enough that maker of the
representation intends [the information] to reach and influence either a particular person or
persons ... or class of persons, distinct from the much larger class who might reasonably be
expected sooner or later to have the access to the information and foreseeably to take some
action in reliance upon it").
148. See supra notes 108-35 and accompanying text (outlining foreseeability approach).
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the Restatement approach. 49  In fact, several state legislatures have
enacted statutes that explicitly embrace the principles embodied in
the Restatement.150  Each statute makes clear that the accountant is
not liable for negligence to any entity with which the accountant is
not in privity, unless the accountant knew that the client intended for
149. See supra note 56 (listing 23 jurisdictions that have adopted Restatement approach); see
also, e.g., Badische Corp. v. Caylor, 825 F.2d 339, 340-41 (11th Cir. 1987) (applying Restatement
§ 552, court held that professional liability for negligence extends to those individuals who (1)
are actually known to professional, and (2) professional knows will rely on information
prepared); Toro Co. v. Krouse, Kern & Co., 827 F.2d 155, 155 (7th Cir. 1987) (deciding that
under Indiana law, accounting firm and individual accountants were not liable to reliant creditor
for negligence in absence of accountants' conduct linking them to creditor and demonstrating
accountants' understanding of creditor's reliance); Bancohio Nat'l Bank v. Schiesswohl, 515
N.E.2d 997, 998 (Ohio CL App. 1986) (relying on Restatement § 552, trial court granted directed
verdict for accountants where no evidence established knowledge on part of accountants that
creditor would receive financial statements).
150. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-302 (Supp. 1991). Section 16-114-302 spccifies that:
No person, partnership, or corporation licensed or authorized to practice under the
Public Accountancy Act of 1975, § 17-12-101 et seq., or any of its employees, partners,
members, officers, or shareholders shall be liable to persons not in privity of contract
with the person, partnership, or corporation for civil damages resulting from acts,
omissions, decisions, or other conduct in connection with professional services
performed by such person, partnership, or corporation, except for:
(1) Acts, omissions, decisions, or conduct that constitutes fraud or intentional
misrepresentations; or
(2) Other acts, omissions, decisions, or conduct if the person, partnership, or
corporation was aware that a primary intent of the client was for the professional
services to benefit or influence the particular person bringing the action. For the
purposes of this subdivision, if the person, partnership, or corporation:
(A) Identifies in writing to the client those persons who are intended to
rely on the services; and
(B) Sends a copy of the writing or similar statement to those persons
identified in the writing or statement, then the person, partnership, or
corporation or any of its employees, partners, members, officers, or
shareholders may be held liable only to the persons intended to so rely,
in addition to those persons in privity of contract with such person,
partnership, or corporation.
Id.; see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 1-402 (1991). Section 1-402 provides that:
No person, proprietorship, partnership, professional corporation or association
authorized to practice as a certified public accountant pursuant to article 3 of chapter
1 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated, or any employee, agent, partner, officer,
shareholder or member thereof, shall be liable to any person or entity for civil
damages resulting from acts, omissions, decisions or other conduct amounting to
negligence in the rendition of professional accounting services unless:
(a) The plaintiff directly engaged such person, proprietorship, partnership,
corporation or association to perform the professional accounting services; or
(b) (1) the defendant knew at the time of the engagement or the defendant
and the client mutually agreed after the time of the engagement that the
professional accounting services rendered the client would be made available to
the plaintiff, who was identified in writing to the defendant; and (2) the
defendant knew that the plaintiff intended to rely upon the professional
accounting services rendered the client in connection with specified transactions
described in writing.
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the accountant's services to benefit or influence that particular enti-
ty.' Knowledge would be established by a writing evidencing that
the auditor knew that the plaintiff was an intended beneficiary of its
services. 152
V. ANALYSIS
The highest courts of California and New York recently reviewed
the extent of an auditor's third-party liability for negligence. Both
cases, the California Supreme Court's decision in Bily v. Arthur Young
& Co.' and the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in
Security Pacific Business Credit v. Peat Marwick Main & Co.,'"4 have
squarely addressed the issue of limiting the class of persons to whom
an auditor may be liable. These decisions are of vital importance
because they set out rules that will guide other jurisdictions.
A. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co.: Knowledge Required to Hold
Accountants Liable
In Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., the California Supreme Court
departed from its earlier determinations of whether an accountant's
duty of care in auditing clients' financial statements extended to
persons other than the client.'55 Addressing the facts before it, the
court decided that the defendant accounting firm, Arthur Young &
Company [Arthur Young], did not owe a duty of care to anyone other
than its client.'56 In accordance with section 552 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, however, the court held that the accountant would
be liable to nonclients who (1) rely on the audit, and (2) the auditor
intended to influence.157 This decision was significant in that
California courts had previously treated privity as a prerequisite to
liability in negligence suits against auditors. 5
151. See supra note 150 (explaining that accountant shall not be liable resulting from
rendition of professional accounting services unless accountant knows that plaintiff intends to
rely on such services).
152. Seesupranote 150 (explaining that knowledge may be established if person, partnership,
or corporation identifies in writing to client those persons who are intended to rely on
professional accounting services).
153. 834 P.2d 745 (Cal.), modified, 3 Cal. 4th 1049a (1992).
154. 597 N.E.2d 1080 (N.Y. 1992).
155. Bily v. ArthurYoung & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 746 (Cal.), modified 3 Cal. 4th 1049a (1992).
156. Id. at 747.
157. See id. (holding, additionally, that accountant would be liable to any reasonably
foreseeable third party if accountant committed intentional fraud in preparing and disseminat-
ing audit report).
158. See Vick, supra note 1, at 1354 (noting court's shift in treatment of auditor's third-party
liability from allowing unlimited recovery to requiring privity between parties).
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The facts of Bily were as follows. In 1980, Adam Osborne formed
Osborne Computer Corporation [Osborne], which manufactured the
first portable personal computer.59  Within two years, sales of
Osborne's sole product, the Osborne I, had escalated so dramatically
that the Osborne I became one of the fastest growing enterprises in
American business history." By 1983, Osborne began preparing
for a public offering,16' which entailed commissioning three invest-
ment banking firms as underwriters. 62 Due to various uncertainties
surrounding the hiring of a new chief executive officer and Osborne's
plan to introduce a replacement for the Osborne I, the underwriters
suggested that the public offering be postponed. 63  Pending the
public offering, however, Osborne required capital financing to
maintain its operations."6 To this end, the corporation sought to
obtain "bridge" financing in the form of bank loans'65 and retained
Arthur Young to audit the company's financial statements, which had
been prepared by Osborne's in-house accounting department.'66
Following the audit, Arthur Young issued clean audit opinions. 67
In essence, the auditor certified that in 1981 Osborne operated at a
loss of $1 million on sales of $6 million, and by 1982 the audit
reported a modest net operating profit of $69,000 on sales of more
than $68 million."6 Relying on the soundness of the corporation
as represented by the auditor's unqualified audit opinion, various
investors, the plaintiffs in Bily, including pension funds and venture
capital investment funds, purchased Osborne common stock.
69
Sales began to decline rapidly when, among other things, produc-
tion of the "Executive," the Osborne I replacement, could not keep
pace with the introduction of IBM personal computers.1 7' The
public offering never materialized and Osborne filed for bankruptcy
159. Bily, 834 P.2d at 747.
160. Id.
161. A public offering of stock occurs when a corporation makes an offering of shares "in
a public manner or to numerous persons." ROBERT W. HAMILTON. CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS 339 (4th ed. 1990). This
requires compliance with federal securities laws. Id.
162. An underwriter is defined by the Securities Act of 1933 as "any person who has
purchased from an issuer with a view to, or offers or sells for an issuer in connection with, the
distribution of any security." See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1988).




167. Id.; see also supra note 26 (discussing clean audit opinions).
168. Bily, 834 P.2d at 748.
169. Id. at 747. One plaintiff, Robert Bily, a director of Osborne Computer Corporation,
purchased 37,500 shares of stock from Adam Osborne for $1.5 million. Id.
170. Id. at 748.
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by September 1983. Consequently, the plaintiffs lost their invest-
ments and sued Arthur Young, alleging that: (1) the 1982 financial
statements were not prepared in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles and standards;172 (2) Osborne's profits were
grossly overstated;1 73 and (3) Arthur Young had discovered material
deficiencies in Osborne's accounting controls that it had failed to
report. 174
At trial, the court instructed the jury in accordance with the
foreseeability standard outlined in an earlier decision,'75 which held
that "[a]n accountant owes a further duty of care to those third
parties who reasonably and foreseeably rely on an audited financial
statement prepared by the accountant. A failure to fulfill any such
duty is negligence.1 76 On appeal, however, the California Supreme
171. Id.
172. Id. The plaintiff's principal expertwitness testified that, following a review of the audit,
he discovered over 40 deficiencies in the performance of the audit, which, in his opinion,
amounted to gross professional negligence on the part of Arthur Young. Id.
173. Id. Although the unqualified audit revealed a $69,000 profit in 1982, Arthur Young
understated the liabilities of the corporation by $3 million. Id. Thus, the corporation's profit
of $69,000 was, in truth, a loss of approximately $3 million. Id.
174. Id. During the course of the audit, a senior accountant atArthurYoung discovered $1.3
million in unrecorded liabilities. Id. He recommended to his superiors that a letter be sent to
the corporation outlining where their in-house accounting controls had failed. Id. The
accountant's superiors did not share his concern and therefore made no disclosure. Id.
175. See International Mortgage Co. v.John P. Butler Accountancy Corp., 223 Cal. Rptr. 218,
225 (1986) (finding that accountant was liable to all foreseeable third parties); see also Vick, supra
note 1, at 1352 (discussing facts and procedures in Bily).
176. Bily, 834 P.2d at 749 (quoting International Mortgage, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 225). In
International Mortgage, a company in the business of buying and selling loans on the secondary
market, approached the accountant's client to buy and sell various government loans, and, in
reliance on erroneous audited financial statements, lost its investment and filed suit against the
auditor. International Mortgage, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 219-20. The court held that an "independent
auditor owes a duty of care to reasonably foreseeable plaintiffs who rely on alleged negligently
prepared and issued unqualified audited financial statements." Id. at 218.
The jury in Bily returned with a verdict in favor of Arthur Young, finding that Young did not
perform the audit fraudulently, and that the audit did not contain negligent misrepresentations.
Bily, 834 P.2d at 749. Thejury did find, however, that Arthur Young had committed professional
negligence and awarded the plaintiffs damages to compensate for the loss on their investment.
See id. (awarding compensatory damages of approximately $4.3 million). On appeal, the
appellate court affirmed thatjudgment, Id. The Supreme Court of California then limited the
holding of the appellate court by concluding that an auditor may be liable for negligent
misrepresentation. See id at 768 (defining separate tort of negligent misrepresentation, which
exists where defendant makes "false statements, honestly believing that they are true, but without
reasonable ground for such belief"). In California, this tort is similar to that of deceit or fraud.
Id.
In analyzing the negligence theory and the legal duty owed by accountants in the absence of
privity between parties, the court looked to factors it had previously outlined in Biakanja v.
Irving, 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958). Bily, 834 P.2d at 761. In Biakanja, the defendant, a
notary public, prepared a will for the testator that was later invalidated because the defendant
negligently failed to have the will properly attested. Biakanja, 320 P.2d at 17. As a result, the
testator died without revoking a previous will, leaving the sole beneficiary of the invalid will with
only one-eighth of the estate. Id. at 19.
Because there was no privity between the parties, the court, as a matter of public policy,
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Court rejected that rule in favor of the Restatement approach, and held
that because the plaintiffs were not clients of Arthur Young they were
unable to recover on a general negligence theory.
177
In rejecting the foreseeability approach, the court in Bily reasoned
that an auditor's potential liability to nonclients could be grossly
disproportionate to its fault, given the secondary "watchdog" role of
the auditor, the complexity of the auditing process, and the potential-
ly tenuous relationship between the audit report and an investor's
economic loss. 178  In addition, the court reasoned that cases involv-
ing generally more sophisticated plaintiffs in the area of accountant
liability, such as banks and investors, are more effectively adjudicated
using contract, rather than tort, liability.179  Finally, the court
abandoned the foreseeability rule because it concluded that the
foreseeability approach does not lead to either more efficient loss
spreading or more accurate accounting.1 80
The court emphasized that every time an accountant prepares an
audit, it is foreseeable that the audit report will be distributed to
banks and investors.' Therefore, to make foreseeability of injury
the determinative factor would be tantamount to imposing liability on
any accountant who performed an audit for a company that defaulted
on loans, became insolvent, or filed for bankruptcy and was unable to
pay its creditors. 82 Accordingly, it was necessary to limit liability for
balanced various factors to determine whether the defendant owed a duty of care. Id. The
factors were: (1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff; (2) the
foreseeability of harm to plaintiff; (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff was injured; (4)
the relationship between the defendant's conduct, and the injury suffered; (5) the moral blame
attached to the defendant's conduct; and (6) the policy of preventing future harm. Id.
In Biakanja, the sole purpose of engaging the notary was to provide the plaintiff with the
testator's estate. I& The court was certain that the defendant must have known that faulty
language would invalidate the will. Id. Further, it was indeed the defendant's poor
draftsmanship that directly deprived plaintiff of the estate. Id.
The court found that the defendant had a duty to exercise due care to protect the
beneficiary. Id. at 17. The plaintiff was awarded the difference between the amount that she
would have received had the will been valid, and the amount actually distributed to her had the
will been properly attested naming plaintiff the beneficiary of decedent's entire estate. Id.
Just as the court in Biakanja declined to limit recovery to privity, the court in Bily declined
to extend accountant liability for negligence to all foreseeable third-party users of the audit
report. Bily, 834 P.2d at 767. This case changed the standard established in International
Mortgage Co., in which the court of appeals had developed the most expansive standard for
determining auditor's liability. International Mortgage, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 227. The court in Bily,
however, limited this ruling significantly. See Bily, 834 P.2d at 767.
177. Bily, 834 P.2d at 774.




182. See id at 761-62 (refusing to allow recovery where damage awards threatens to impose
liability not proportional to fault).
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intangible injury, such as economic loss. The court stated that
"'policy considerations may dictate a cause of action should not be
sanctioned no matter how foreseeable the risk... in order to avoid
an intolerable burden on society."
1" 83
1. Liability disproportionate to fault
To demonstrate how potential liability for accountants to third
parties is disproportionate to accountants' fault for negligently
preparing audit reports, the court in Bily analogized accountants to
"watchdog[s], not ... bloodhound[s]." 184 This analogy suggests
that bloodhounds are capable of discovering things that have been
hidden, while a watchdog is limited to recognizing only visible objects
that may seem out of the ordinary or suspicious. The court noted
that, as a matter of commercial reality, an accountant operates in a
"client-controlled environment" because it is the client, not the
auditor, who prepares financial statements, controls what information
is contained in them, and accordingly is responsible for their
accuracy."8 5 In the limited time that an accountant has to prepare
the audit, the accountant cannot be expected to "become an expert
in the client's business and record-keeping systems." 86 Instead, the
auditor is forced to rely on the information furnished by the
client.'
87
The client is also in the position to disseminate the audit report to
any entity it chooses, ' and the auditor does not control who
receives the work product.8 9 In essence, despite a limited role in
the process, the auditor potentially faces "massive" liability in a
negligence suit by nonclients. 9 ° There is the added possibility that
the client has liquidated or filed for bankruptcy and the auditor sits
"center stage as the remaining solvent defendant and is faced with a
claim for all sums of money ever loaned to or invested in the client.
Yet the auditor may never have been aware of the existence... of the
third party transaction that resulted in the claim."' 9 ' The auditor
merely becomes a prime target as a solvent party who had direct





188. See id. (noting that report distribution and accompanying communications are
exclusively controlled by client).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 763.
191. Id.
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contact with the client's business transactions. 92 In sum, the court
reasoned that, given the considerations outlined above, public policy
dictated that such unlimited liability, so disproportionate to fault, was
unjustifiable and unfair.'
2. Theories of contract liability found more appropriate
The foreseeability approach to auditor liability has been grounded
in analogies to tort liability for manufacturers of consumer goods.
94
The court in Bily rejected that approach, distinguishing a maker of a
consumer product, which exclusively controls what goes into that
product, with an auditor, who is at its client's mercy with respect to
what is contained in financial reports. 95 In addition, those who rely
on audit reports, such as investors, banks, and creditors, are sophisti-
cated as to the nuances of audits and financial reports, unlike
consumers who generally lack knowledge of a product's makeup.'96
Third-party investors, creditors, and banks have the power to ensure
that an audit is accurate, and to take appropriate steps to reduce the
risks of poor investing and lending.197  For example, a third party
could hire its own accountant to verify the information contained in
the audit report.198 In doing so, privity is established between the
third party and the auditor it hired. 99 Another option would be for
the third party to establish direct communication with the initial
auditor sufficient to render the auditor expressly aware that the third
party intends to rely on the audit reports."' 0 The court in Bily
summarized its contract liability argument by stating that "as a matter
of economic and social policy, third parties should be encouraged to
192. See Siliciano, supra note 5, at 1932-33 (noting that because claims against client are
usually precluded by client's insolvency, injured party's focus turns to auditor).
193. See Bily, 834 P.2d at 764 (suggesting that "disproportionate liability cannot fairly be
justified on moral, ethical or economic grounds"); Siliciano, supra note 5, at 1944-45 (noting
that disproportionate liability for negligence might deter socially beneficial activity and result
in enormous administrative costs).
194. See Bily, 834 P.2d at 764 (noting that demise of privity as barrier to products liability
actions implies that privity is irrelevant in accountant liability actions).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 765.
197. See id. (contrasting "presumptively powerless consumer" in product liability cases with
third party in audit negligence cases, who has ability to protect himself through "other options");
infra notes 199-201 and accompanying text (discussing options for reducing risk).
198. See Bily, 834 P.2d at 765 (noting ways third party can limit risk).
199. Id.
200. Id.; see also Siliciano, supra note 5, at 1956-57 (noting that sophisticated creditor can
protect itself against prospect that client will inaccurately portray financial conditions by
expending resources to improve quality of financial information). Direct contact between the
third party and the auditor was a key consideration in Security Pacific Business Credit v. Peat
Marwick Main & Co., 597 N.E.2d 1080 (N.Y. 1992). See infra notes 223-28 and accompanying
text (discussing significance of telephone call between auditor and third party).
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rely on their own prudence, diligence, and contracting power ....
This kind of self-reliance promotes sound investment ..... 201
3. Loss spreading and accurate accounting
Proponents of the foreseeability approach argue that broad-based
auditor liability promotes more diligent accounting and loss spread-
ing.2" 2 The court in Bily disagreed, however, because "the stronger
the probability that liability will be incurred when performance is
adequate, the weaker is the deterrent effect of liability rules." 203 In
addition, allowing unlimited liability, a product of the foreseeability
approach, would inevitably lead to an onslaught of litigation and
require expending exorbitant financial resources while businesspeople
seek to recover losses. 0 4
For the reasons stated above, the court in Bily held that persons
other than the accountant's client could not recover on a pure
negligence theory,205 except where the nonclient was an intended
beneficiary of the information, and this identity was made known to
the auditor.20 6 The court opined that its findings were most consis-
tent with section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.207 Like the
Restatement approach, the court in Bily required that the provider of
the information, the auditor, have notice that the third party would
be receiving the information.2 s In effect, by notifying the auditor
of the scope of his liability to nonclients, the auditor could attempt
to decrease the potential for liability.
For instance, the accountant could ensure that its insurance
adequately covered the risk of litigation.0°  In addition, the
nonclient investor or creditor could establish direct communication
201. Bily, 834 P.2d at 765.
202. See id. (stating that proponents of foreseeability approach to liability predict that it will
"deter auditor mistakes, promote more careful audits, and result in more efficient spreading of
the risk"); see also H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 152 (NJ. 1983) (suggesting that
stricter standards would reduce number of instances where auditors would be held liable for
negligence); Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 335 N.W.2d 361, 366 (Wis. 1983)
(rejecting Restatement and privity approaches, and imposing liability on accountants for
foreseeable injuries resulting from their negligent acts).
203. Bily, 834 P.2d at 766.
204. Id. at 767.
205. Id. This did not mean that recovery for fraud was foreclosed. As Chief'Judge Cardozo's
opinion in Ultramares indicated, an exception exists where liability for fraud was found despite
the lack of a contractual relationship. See Ultramares Corp. v. Touche Niven & Co., 174 N.E.
441, 444 (N.Y. 1931).
206. Bily, 834 P.2d at 767.
207. See id at 769.
208. Id.
209. See id. at 765.
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with the auditor, thereby reducing its risk of bad investment.210
Finally, by requiring specific knowledge of third-party beneficiaries'
identities, a connection is established that more closely resembles
privity.
2 n
B. Security Pacific Business Credit v. Peat Marwick Main & Co.
Although courts have continued to chip away at or reject the
doctrine of privity, New York courts have continued to act as guardian
to Chief Judge Cardozo's Ultramares opinion.212 For example, the
New York Court of Appeals, in Security Pacific Business Credit v. Peat
Marwick Main & Co., undertook to determine how much contact
between a third party and auditor is sufficient to create liability.
213
In that case, Security Pacific, an institutional lender, relied on an
auditor's unqualified audit opinion indicating that Top Brass was in
a strong financial position, and loaned Top Brass approximately $40
million. 14 Two years after the loan was made, Top Brass defaulted
on its loans and filed for bankruptcy.215 Thereafter, Security Pacific
sued the auditor, Peat Marwick, for pecuniary losses, alleging that it
had relied on Marwick's audit opinion, which negligently indicated
that Top Brass' financial statements reflected its financial condi-
tion.216  This reliance ostensibly stemmed from a telephone call
from Security Pacific's vice president to an accounting partner at Peat
Marwick.21"
The trial record indicated that Top Brass retained the auditor for
the purpose of stating an opinion on its financial statements.28 At
no time did Top Brass mention either Security Pacific or a pending
loan requiring an unqualified audit opinion.2t 9 Once Peat Marwick
completed a draft opinion, Top Brass sent a copy to Security Pacific
210. See id. at 757 (suggesting that liability insurance may help accountants "spread the risk").
211. Id.
212. See Security Pac. Business Credit v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 597 N.E.2d 1080, 1087
(N.Y. 1992) (noting that court was following precedent and intended to preserve wisdom and
policy set forth in Utramares, Glanzer, and White).
213. See id. at 1081 (finding defendant not liable because relationship was not "'sufficiently
approaching privity'") (quoting Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110,
119 (N.Y. 1985)).
214. Id. at 1082.
215. Id. at 1083.
216. Id. It was discovered, one year too late, that 30% of Top Brass' accounts receivable were
uncollectible. Id. Instead of reflecting this substantial loss, the audit report indicated profits
that did not in fact exist. Id.
217. Id. at 1081.




for review.2  At the suggestion of Top Brass officers,"' the vice
president of Security Pacific then telephoned the audit partner at Peat
Marwick to discuss the audit report. This contact was the "linchpin
of plaintiff's claim. 222
The court followed the rule established in Credit Alliance 2 3 that
requires a relationship, demonstrated by certain conduct, "sufficiently
approaching privity. ' '2 24  Security Pacific argued that the single
telephone call was sufficient contact to create a bond of privity.2
The court in Security Pacific, however, found that this conduct fell
short of the criteria required in Credit Alliance.226 The court in
Security Pacific noted the stark contrast between one call and the
multiple and direct communications and personal meetings with the
third-party lender in European American Ban 22 ' To hold otherwise,
the court further explained, would give recourse to a lender any time
it made one simple phone call. 228
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. See id. (suggesting that telephone call was only evidence of any affirmative conduct
linking third party and auditor in way that auditor could reasonably know that third party
intended to rely on information). Noting that the New York rule provided little guidance as to
what "linking" conduct was sufficient to establish liability, the court in Bily had questioned the
value of the New York rule in light of the following scenario:
From preengagement communications with its client, an auditor may acquire full
knowledge of third party recipients of the audit report and a specific investment or
credit transaction that constitutes the "end and aim" of the audit. As a consequence,
the auditor is placed on notice of a specific risk of liability that accompanies the audit
engagement. Yet, under the [New York] test, the auditor appears to have no liability
in this situation in the absence of further, distinct conduct "linking" the auditor to the
third party in a manner that "evinces [auditor] understanding" of third party reliance.
Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 754 (Cal.), modified, 3 Cal. 4th 1049a (1992). The
majority in Bily saw little necessity in maintaining a linking element when the auditor had actual
knowledge of the identity of the third party as well as the fact that the auditor's work was meant
to benefit that identifiable third party. Id.
223. Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 1985); see supra
notes 97-99 and accompanying text (outlining Credit Alliance rule).
224. Security Pac., 597 N.E.2d at 1083.
225. Id. at 1085.
226. Id. In his dissent, Judge Hancock protested that the majority failed to indicate what
conduct would be sufficient to evince the auditor's understanding of the third party's reliance.
Id. at 1091 (Hancock, J., dissenting). Indeed, Hancock went further in stating that, in his
opinion, the phone call was clearly sufficient conduct to evince such understanding on the part
of the auditor. Id. at 1092.
227. 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 1985). European American Bankwas decided as a companion case
to Credit Alliance Security Paa., 597 N.E.2d at 1084, 1085 (relying on evidence indicating that
accountant was aware, prior to issuing unqualified audit opinion, that client was involved in
negotiations for credit line to be secured by accounts receivable).
228. See id. (commenting that third party "cannot unilaterally create such an extraordinary
obligation, imposing negligence liability of significant dimension and consequences, by merely
interposing and announcing its reliance in this fashion"); id. at 1086 ("For the small price of a
phone call, the bank would in effect acquire additional loan protection [by] placing the auditor
in the role of an insurer or guarantee of loans extended to [its] clients.").
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Bily and Security Pacific are highly significant to the accounting
profession in that they limit accountant liability in the absence of
privity. Although Bily recognized the necessity of privity, the court
allowed exceptions to the rule where evidence established that the
accountant had reason to know the information supplied would be
relied on by a specifically known beneficiary.229 Security Pacific goes
further than Bily by addressing the degree of contact that establishes
privity between noncontracting parties.3  Security Pacific falls short
of effectively impacting the field of accountant liability, however,
because the court failed to enumerate what is in fact a sufficient
contact. Instead, it merely suggested that one telephone conversation
will not be sufficient to hold an accountant liable.
A. Foreseeability Is Too Expansive to Provide Incentive for Accountants to
Improve Services
Because the foreseeability test expands liability significantly, there
is little incentive for auditors to improve the quality of their services.
The more likely it is that liability will be imposed, the weaker the
accountant's incentive to perform diligently.231  Even if an accoun-
tant has exercised due care in performing the audit, the client still
retains ultimate control by virtue of furnishing information supplied
to the auditor, thereby controlling to whom the information is
distributed. 32 Therefore, "there will always be a margin of error in
audit opinions. "233
In addition, under the foreseeability approach an accountant has
little incentive to perform audits in the first place, considering the
229. See Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 747 (Cal.) (referring to tort of negligent
misrepresentation), modified, 3 Cal. 4th 1049a (1992); Vick, supra note 1, at 1358-59 (describing
application of negligent misrepresentation tort to auditor liability cases).
230. See Security Pac., 597 N.E.2d at 1083 (holding that liability exists where: (1) accountants
were aware reports were to be used for particular purpose; (2) in furtherance of which a known
party was intended to rely that party would rely, and (3) there was "linking" conduct).
231. See Bily, 834 P.2d at 766 (discussing ineffectiveness of broad liability rules).
232. See supra notes 184-92 and accompanying text (discussing client control over audit
information).
233. Vick, supra note 1, at 1360. Although Vick's article is cited frequently throughout this
Comment, it should be noted that Vick's recommendations and conclusions differ from those
proffered by this Author. For example, Vick's article was written prior to the decision in Security
Pacific and therefore presents only part of the discussion in this Comment. In addition, Vick
identified, in his legal analysis, a variety of questions that he felt remained unanswered. This
Author, however, has been successful in developing responses to these and other questions
through analysis and recent decisions. See also supra notes 184-93 and accompanying text




potential liability to a reliant third party. By the same token, the
advantages gained by the third party may be significant, considering
that "far-removed third parties can reap the full benefits of successful
investments and enjoy some protection against bad investments at the
auditor's expense."
234
There is a further potential that as the number of parties to whom
the auditor may be held liable increases, premiums charged by the
auditor will rise as well. 2"5 After all, there is little incentive for the
auditor to keep its fees down in the face of great risks incurred simply
by conducting an audit."6 These increased costs paid by clients will
in turn be passed on to the consumer.3 7
As the number of lawsuits filed by third parties against negligent
auditors continues to rise, many insurance carriers become hesitant
to insure an auditor for professional liability,238 and insurance will
become increasingly difficult for auditors to obtain.3 9 Even those
carriers that are still willing to insure the auditor continue to increase
their premiums.24
B. The Strict Pivity Approach Is Too Narrow
Accountants have just as little incentive to perform quality audits
under the privity doctrine as they do under the foreseeability
approach. Although the court in Ultramares recognized that accoun-
tants could be exposed to limitless liability if the foreseeability
approach were applied,241 its adherence to a strict privity require-
ment was as limiting as the foreseeability approach is broad.
Requiring privity of contract significantly reduces the number of
parties to whom the accountant is liable; this theory allows only the
client to recover. As discussed above, however, it is a common
business practice for the client to share the information prepared by
234. Vick, supra note 1, at 1360.
235. Vick, supra note 1, at 1360.
236. Vick, supra note 1, at 1356.
237. Vick, supra note 1, at 1360.
238. Vick, supra note 1, at 1337-38.
239. ick, supra note 1, at 1361.
240. See Vick, supra note 1, at 1337-38 (noting that "between 1985 and 1986 every major
insurance carrier stopped writing liability insurance policies for California accountants.
Premiums in California have skyrocketed, increasing approximately 1480% since 1984, despite
the profession's efforts to keep premiums down by creating and running its own non-profit
carrier"). The results are clear fewer and fewer accountants are insured. Id. Estimates indicate
that, as a consequence, "41% of accounting firms no longer perform audits and 76% will not
do audits for... public offerings." Id. at 1338.
241. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche Niven & Co., 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931).
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the accountant with other business entities.22 Absent fraud by the
auditor, privity provides little recourse for a third-party lender or
investor who has relied on negligently prepared audits and financial
statements. Consequently, the possibility exists that investors and
lenders will be more hesitant in extending credit or capital.
C. The Intermediate Approach Achieves the Best Results
Adherence to the Restatement approach will clearly provide direction
to auditors.243 The accountant will be cognizant of the risks in-
volved in performing an audit and act accordingly.244 In addition,
third parties will be aware that a relationship with the auditor must be
established in order to sue the accountant for economic loss. This
could be done by contract,"' or the third party could hire its own
auditor.
To ensure understanding and compliance, however, state legisla-
tures should codify the Restatement approach. This would be the most
effective method of ameliorating the increasing problems associated
with accountant liability to nonclients. Several jurisdictions have
already done this.24 Statutes would achieve several objectives. First,
the auditor will have a statutory basis to guide conduct if the
accountant negligently prepares an audit for a client that is then
relied upon by a third party. Second, clear statutory language would
place third parties on notice that if they intend to invest in, or extend
financing to, a business enterprise, they must take affirmative steps to
ensure they are proceeding cautiously.
CONCLUSION
The foreseeability approach, which expands tort liability, provides
little or no incentive for auditors to perform their audit with due care
and diligence, or to curtail the premiums they charge. Limiting
liability to instances where strict privity exists would be equally
ineffective because it would leave many reliant third-party business
entities without recourse. Even where the accountant knows that an
242. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing tendency for audits to be used to
attract lenders and investors).
243. SeeVick, supra note 1, at 1361 (indicating that Bily makes liability more predictable and,
consequently, parties can make more informed decisions).
244. See Vick, supra note 1, at 1361-62.
245. If a contract was executed between the third party and the accountant, privity would
be created by law and the third party would be no longer just that The third party would be
a client who can bring an action for negligence against the accountant under any of the theories
of contract liability.
246. See supra note 54 (applying statutory guidelines for privity doctrine).
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intended beneficiary exists, the accountant would not be liable
because a contractual relationship did not exist between the parties.
Accordingly, the consequences for investors and creditors may be
significant.
Unlike the foreseeability and privity approaches, the Restatement
approach is the most equitable rule, evidenced by its adoption by a
large number of jurisdictions.247 Section 552 is a compromise
approach that clearly attains the goals of promoting fairness and
deterring negligent conduct by the auditor. At the same time, it
promotes responsible conduct on the part of sophisticated lenders
and investors, while taking into account the commercial and
economic realities of the marketplace.
247. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (noting that majority of jurisdictions have
adopted Restatement approach).
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